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ABSTRACT
It has been widely recognized that automated bots may have a sig-
nificant impact on the outcomes of national events. It is important
to raise public awareness about the threat of bots on social media
during these important events, such as the 2018 US midterm elec-
tion. To this end, we deployed a web application to help the public
explore the activities of likely bots on Twitter on a daily basis. The
application, called Bot Electioneering Volume (BEV), reports on
the level of likely bot activities and visualizes the topics targeted
by them. With this paper we release our code base for the BEV
framework, with the goal of facilitating future efforts to combat
malicious bots on social media.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Social bots have drawn great attention from the public recently.
They are accounts on social media platforms controlled at least in
part by algorithms to generate/share/retweet content and interact
with human users [5]. The automated nature of social bots makes
it easy to achieve scalability, with which a single person is capable
to control thousands of accounts on one or more social media
platforms. When needed, these social bots can work collectively to
manipulate the public by promoting certain accounts or opinions.
Being social animals, human users are inevitably vulnerable to
the efforts of the social bots. Studies have shown ubiquitous social
bots [12] distort online discussions, and particularly those about
politics. During the 2010 US midterm election, primitive social
bots were used to attack some candidates [6] and spread tweets
with links to fake news websites [7]. A similar pattern emerged
in the 2016 US presidential election, only with more sophisticated
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bots that aimed to effectively push their messages to the target
audience [1]. In particular, bots were most active in the core of
the misinformation-sharing network [10] and effectively amplified
the spread of low-credibility content by posting it within seconds
and by targeting influential accounts [9]. Analogous automated
campaigns were reported in countries around the globe [4, 11].
Here we present Bot Electioneering Volume (BEV), a platform
that visualizes the volume generated by bots and the corresponding
targeted topics. BEV tracks online traffic centered around elections
Figure 1: Illustration of BEV’s (a) crawler, (b) database, (c) an-
alyzer, and screen shot of (d) front-end interface. The upper
panel of the frontend shows the Bot Electioneering Volume
for the past 8 days. Users can select a day of interest to ex-
plore the top topics of that day. The bottom panels show a
tag cloud and entity lists for the selected day. The tag cloud
presents entities all together, with the size of each entity pro-
portional to how often it is tweeted by bots. The entity lists
display hashtags, mentions, and links ranked by how often
each is tweeted by bots.
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from Twitter by feeding the streaming API with a list of selected
hashtags. By incorporating the bot-detection ability of Botometer
[3, 12, 13], BEV is able to distinguish between content generated by
likely bots and humans. The measurement of average bot activity is
then compared with random samples of tweets to produce a number
that quantifies electioneering activity by bots. BEV also collects
content topics, including hashtags, mentions, and URLs shared by
likely bots, and reports on their relative volumes.
BEV (botometer.iuni.iu.edu/bev) monitored public tweets about
the 2018 US midterm elections between October 22, 2018 and Dec
30, 2018. During the collection period, BEV drew over 3,000 visits.
An archive of the data from Oct to Dec 2018 remains publicly
available for retrospective inspections. We plan to activate BEV
again for future elections. Our goal is to raise public awareness
of bot activities and their impact during elections in the past, and
more importantly those in the future.
2 SYSTEM DESIGN
The BEV system contains 4 major parts: a crawler, a database, an
analyzer, and a front-end interface, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The crawler is in charge of tracking Twitter’s filtering API for
public election-related tweets, querying Twitter’s Spritzer API for
random samples of public tweets, and fetching bot scores. Crawled
data is stored in the database. The analyzer then extracts the re-
quired information and generates the statistics for the visualization
at the application frontend. The frontend has three major parts: the
Bot Electioneering Volume timeline, a tag cloud, and entity lists.
The Bot Electioneering Volume measures the activity of likely bots,
while the tag could and entity lists display the topics that are most
tweeted by likely bots. By clicking on the links in an entity list,
users are directed to Hoaxy (hoaxy.iuni.iu.edu) [8], where they can
explore more in-depth visualizations of the influence of bots around
the entities on Twitter in the recent minutes/hours/days.
The data collection runs in a streaming fashion, but fetching bot
scores and analyzing the data take time. The front-end interface is
updated every 4 hours to reflect newly incoming data.
2.1 Data collection
The collection of election-related tweets is crucial to our applica-
tion. Our collection process starts with a set of election-related
hashtags that are tracked using the Twitter filtering API. We seeded
our set of hashtags with several widely-used political hashtags in-
cluding #2018midterms, #maga, and #bluewave. We then repeatedly
expanded the set with co-occuring hashtags [2], resulting in a set of
110 hashtags. From this set we manually removed 6 hashtags that
are general and irrelevant to election. We also added the hashtags
for each US state’s Senate race: #casen, #nysen, and so on. The full
list of hashtags can be found in the FAQ page of the BEV website.
This methodology allows our system to collect most tweets with
newly emerging election hashtags, because it is likely that these
tweets contain some of the hashtags in our list as well.
Twitter’s free filtering API offers at most 1% of Twitter’s traffic.
We estimated that the traffic captured by our method is about 0.3–
0.5% of Twitter’s complete traffic (see Figure 2(a)). This means that
instead of a sample, BEV collects and visualizes bot activities based
on all of the targeted election-related tweets.
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Figure 2: (a) Number of election tweets and unique users for
each day. (b) Average bot scores for election tweets and ran-
dom sample. (c) BEV timeline. The 2018 US midterm elec-
tions day, Nov 6, is highlighted by a vertical dashed line.
2.2 Bot identification
BEV uses Botometer (botometer.iuni.iu.edu) [3, 12, 13] to obtain bot
scores for Twitter accounts involved in election-related discourse.
Botometer is a supervised machine learning algorithm that consid-
ers more than a thousand features about an account and its activity
to estimate the likelihood that the account is automated. We con-
sider accounts with bot score above 4 (on a 5-point scale) as social
bots. This is a fairly conservative threshold choice, corresponding
to a posterior probability of automation near 50% [13] based on a
15% prior probability [12].
2.3 Bot activity measurement
To measure the bot electioneering volume, we first take daily av-
erages of the bot scores of accounts generating political tweets,
weighted by their tweet frequencies. Considering that spamming
the same message is a common strategy for bots, the weighted
average better highlights the amount of bot-generated content and
their potential influence. To obrain a baseline of bot activity, we
produce the same weighted average for random tweets from Twit-
ter’s Spritzer API, with a rate of 1,000 tweets per hour. The daily
average bot scores for election and random tweets are shown in
Figure 2(b).
The Bot Electioneering Volume is defined by the relative differ-
ence between the two averages:
BEV =
SElectoral − SRandomSample
SRandomSample
, (1)
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Figure 3: (a) Proportion of tweets by bots for election tweets
and random sample. (b) BEV2.
where SElectoral and SRandomSample represent the average bot scores
of electoral and random tweets, respectively. BEV is shown as
a percentage difference in the front-end interface, as shown in
Figure 1(d). Figure 2(c) plots the Bot Electioneering Volume of the
whole midterm elections period.
In the design stage of BEV, we considered different metrics by
replacing the average bot score S in Eq. 1 with the median score and
the proportion of tweets by bots. The Bot Electioneering Volume
based on median values of the scores yields patterns similar to the
average score version. However, the version based on the proportion
of tweets by bots (denoted by BEV2) shows different trends. As
shown in Figure 3(a), the baseline proportion of tweets by bots
decreases steadily after the midterm elections. Consequently, the
BEV2 value increases (Figure 3(b)). Since the proportion of tweets
by likely bots in the random sample is not stable, we decided to
deploy the BEV metric based on average bot scores.
The BEV front-end interface also visualizes the topics targeted
by likely bots. For simplicity, we only extract hashtags, mentioned
accounts, and links from the tweets generated by bots. The targeted
topics are represented in a tag cloud and entity lists.
3 DISCUSSION
BEV reveals many interesting patterns. In terms of the discussion
intensity, the number of election tweets before the election was
about twice as many as the number after the election day peak,
as shown in Figure 2(a). For bot activity, all the different metrics
— average bot score, median bot score, and proportion of tweets
by likely bots — are much higher for election tweets, suggesting
that bots are actively generating election-related content; they are
indeed employed for electioneering.
The average bot scores of election-related tweets fluctuated from
day to day. The BEV on November 6 and 7 was drastically lower
than on other days. Considering the spike in election tweets, we
hypothesize that the bot activity was diluted by the huge amount
of normal users around election day. Furthermore, the average bot
scores of election-related tweets after the election are generally
higher than those before the election. This is perhaps because many
human users ceased to tweet political content after the election,
but the bots kept working. BEV cannot reflect the changes in total
volume of tweets because it is based on averaging the daily scores.
For the future, a measurement that can leverage both the average
bot score and the volume of tweets may be preferable to better
represent the volume generated by bots.
4 CONCLUSION
We offer a real-time tool to visualize the electioneering activities of
social bots. Open-source code for BEV is at github.com/IUNetSci/BEV.
Around the 2018 US midterm elections, bot electioneering was
rampant. The great majority of content amplified by likely bots was
on the conservative side of the political spectrum. It remains to be
seen if this will change in the future.
The tool enables the public to gain a sense of the organic nature of
the online discussion regarding elections and spot possibly polluted
content. By performing the hashtag list generation procedure with
different seeds, BEV can be adapted to target future US elections,
as well as elections and events in other countries.
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